Over the past decade, the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (“POSH Act”) has established itself as the principal law for protecting women against sexual harassment at the workplace, requiring employers to constitute internal committees, conduct awareness programmes, and follow a defined procedure for the redressal of complaints. On the question of forum, the POSH Act is clear: a complaint against a co-employee is to be inquired into by the Internal Complaints Committee, while a complaint against the “employer” lies before the Local Complaints Committee. The more pressing question, however, is who, in law, is the “employer.” The determination of this question is imperative for ensuring fairness in the inquiry of complaints.

The Statutory Scheme of the POSH Act

The Act provides for two forums for the redressal of complaints related to sexual harassment by a woman. Section 4 requires every employer of a workplace with ten or more employees to constitute an Internal Complaints Committee (“ICC”). Section 6 requires every District Officer to constitute a Local Complaints Committee (“LCC”), which has jurisdiction where no ICC has been constituted, or where the complaint is against the employer himself. The reason for the latter is plain: a complaint against the employer cannot be inquired into by a committee that the employer controls.

Jurisdiction, therefore, turns on two definitions. Section 2(f) defines “employee” broadly, to cover any person employed for work, by whatever name called. Section 2(g) defines “employer” as, in a government establishment, the head of the department, and in any other workplace, the person responsible for its management, supervision and control. The scheme is clear but the difficulty lies in applying these definitions to a person who heads the institution. A recent judgment of the Kerala High Court in Prof. (Dr.) J. Sundaresan Pillai v. Dr. K.K. Seethalakshmi & Ors.(WA No. 534 of 2026) provides a useful occasion to consider that question, and the scheme of the POSH Act around it.

The Judgment in Prof. (Dr.) J. Sundaresan Pillai v. Dr. K.K. Seethalakshmi & Ors

The appellant was the Director of the Integrated Rural Technology Centre (“IRTC”). A woman employee filed a complaint of sexual harassment against him, and the Presiding Officer of the ICC issued a summons notice requiring his appearance. The Director filed a writ petition before a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court seeking to set aside the notice on the ground that he was the “employer” under Section 2(g) of the POSH Act and that the complaint therefore lay before the LCC. The petition was dismissed, and the present writ appeal followed.

Before the Hon’ble Kerala High Court, the Director contended that he was the head of the institution and relied on IRTC’s Memorandum of Association to show that the management of IRTC’s affairs was vested in the Director, and alleged that the Presiding Officer had a conflict of interest. He further argued that, since he was an employer under Section 2(g), the complaint should be heard by the LCC in accordance with Section 6 of the POSH Act.

The respondents also relied on the same Memorandum of Association to contend that it is the general body and executive committee that have the control, administration and management of the affairs of IRTC, and therefore the Director can only be termed as an employee of the IRTC. Thus, the issue before the Hon’ble court was whether the Director would fall under the definition of employee under Section 2(f) or employer under Section 2(g) of the POSH Act.

The Kerala High Court examined the aforementioned provisions of the POSH Act along with IRTC’s Memorandum of Association and held that the Director’s title alone was not sufficient to determine his status under the Act. The Court looked at where actual management and control of the institution vested. On a combined reading of the relevant clauses of the IRTC Memorandum as well as the provisions of the POSH Act, the Court held that the control, administration and management of IRTC’s affairs were vested in the general body and the executive committee, and not in the Director.

The Director’s management of those affairs was itself subject to the supervision of the executive committee, and the Director was appointed by that committee. In these circumstances, the appellant Director could only be treated as an employee, and the ICC was competent to inquire into the complaint against him. The Hon’ble High Court therefore dismissed the appeal and affirmed the view taken by the Single Judge.

Key Takeaways

What gives the decision its wider significance is the approach of the Court. The Court looked past the Director’s designation to where control over the institution actually lay. In case of private and non-government organisations, the POSH Act identifies the “employer” by function and not by rank. A Director, Chief Executive or Head of Institution may well be an “employee” where real control is vested in a board or governing body.

The decision also carries an important lesson for organisations. The Court settled the Director’s status by examining the organisation’s Memorandum of Association. In doing so, it demonstrated that the same governance structures that define authority within an organisation may also determine its legal position under the POSH Act. Organisations should therefore review their Memorandum of Association, Articles of Association or bye-laws to ensure that their governance structure clearly identifies where management and supervisory authority lies.

Doing so not only promotes effective corporate governance, but also helps avoid uncertainty if questions of jurisdiction arise under the POSH Act. At the same time, the conclusion in this case turned on the specific constitutional documents of IRTC. It is not authority for the proposition that every director, in every organisation, is an employee. Where the governing documents genuinely vest control in such individuals, the LCC may well be the forum with jurisdiction.

The decision therefore serves as a useful reminder that, under the POSH Act, the question of who is an “employer” is ultimately one of control rather than designation.